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Since its inauguration in 1954, the ﬁeld of modern transplantation has made great strides in surgical
technique, the prevention of acute and chronic rejection, the minimization of immunosuppression-
related side-effects and transplant tolerance. As such, organ transplantation is used worldwide as a
curative, life-saving treatment for people with end-stage organ failure. However, the successes of organ
transplantation have resulted in the number of patients on transplant waiting lists far exceeding the
number of organs available, with growing numbers of patients dying while awaiting transplants.
In order to address this critical organ shortage, a number of legislative changes have been imple-
mented worldwide to increase the number of individuals registering as organ donors. These have
included presumed consent donation, incentivized organ donation, commercial organ transplantation
and mandated choice models.
This article will address these public health policies in turn. The implementation of these strategies
and the evidence for their efﬁcacy will be evaluated. Based on this, we have identiﬁed that well-
supported transplant coordinators approaching next-of-kin, incentives and public health campaigns
are key factors that increase organ donation. Finally we propose a modiﬁed mandated choice model that
may be an alternative option to maximize the number of available organs for transplantation.
© 2014 Surgical Associates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The great success of modern-day organ transplantation has
resulted in its biggest conundrum e the number of people waiting
for transplants is simply higher than the number of organssearch Center, Massachusetts
, MA 02129 USA.
arajah@tbrc.mgh.harvard.edu
by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reservedavailable. In the United States alone, even with over 30,000 organ
transplants performed last year, 18 people die daily on transplant
waiting lists [1]. In order to address this challenge, transplant sur-
geons have adopted Expanded Donor Criteria, including Donation
after Cardiac Deathwith the aim of increasing the number of organs
that can be retrieved from potential donors. But perhaps more
signiﬁcantly, various public health policies have been employed to
increase the actual number of registered donors. Many of these
policies have been associated with increased rates of organ.
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have had a causative effect is controversial.
This article will review the literature concerning the imple-
mentation of various public health policies and aim to identify
factors that increase organ donation. The implementation and ef-
ﬁcacy of presumed consent organ donation, incentivized organ
donation, commercial organ transplants and mandated choice
models will be assessed.
2. Presumed consent organ donation
A no-action default in public policy is the condition imposed
when an individual fails to make a decision. In an explicit consent
or “opt-in” system, people will not become organ donors unless
they register. By contrast, in a presumed consent or “opt-out” sys-
tem, individuals are organ donors unless they register not to be.
Opt-out systems have been described as “hard” when the stated
wishes of the deceased patient are adhered towithout consultation
of the family. On the other hand, “soft” opt-out systems incorporate
the wishes of family members.
A number of studies across Spain, Austria, Belgium and
Singapore have observed an increase in organ donation following
the implementation of opt-out legislation [2]. Similarly, compari-
son studies have shown increased donor rates in countries with
opt-out systems compared with opt-in systems (Fig. 1) [3e6]. It has
been suggested that adoption of an opt-out policy may increase
organ donation for three reasons: (i) decision-makers identify the
default choice as the recommended choice by the policy maker, (ii)
demonstrating a choice requires effort, and many people would
rather avoid making an unpleasant decision about organ donation
and, (iii) loss aversion, or fear of change [7].
Despite the correlations between high donor rates and opt-out
policies, the implementation of opt-out systems for organ dona-
tion has been controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly, the
ethics of assuming consent from silence has been questioned. These
concerns are particularly important to transplant recipients, who
need to know that their organwas donated freely and altruistically,Fig. 1. Comparison of the donation rate with the donation system used (presumed versus
organ donation. These 2012 data are based on the Global Observatory on Donation and Traand intensive care practitioners who have expressed fears that opt-
out systems could damage vital end-of-life relationships between
physicians, patients and families [8]. The removal of organs from
patients who did not wish to donate, but did not explicitly opt-out
raises the possibility of negatively impacting the public's percep-
tion of transplantation and may thwart efforts to increase organ
donation rates. Such drops in organ donation rates have been
observed in some countries, such as Chile, following passage of opt-
out legislation [9].
Secondly, while the previously described association studies
have shown a relationship between opt-out systems and higher
numbers of organ donors, the true efﬁcacy of opt-out legislation
remains to be conﬁrmed. The scientiﬁc evidence that legislation
alone can increase organ donation is unclear as policy changes are
not made in isolation and concomitant changes made with opt-out
legislation may act as confounding factors. For example, imple-
mentation of opt-out systems have been followed by government
funding for transplant programs, hospital-level reimbursement for
identifying donors, improved infrastructure and coordination of
transplant networks, increased public awareness and education on
organ donation and positive public attitudes towards trans-
plantation [3,10]. The fact that legislation itself does not change
organ donation rates is well illustrated by the Spanish experience.
Currently, Spain has the highest rate of organ donors in the world
and utilizes an opt-out system which was introduced in 1979.
However, the rate of organ donation only increased, from 14.3 to
over 30 donors per million population, with the creation of
Organizacion Nacional de Trasplantes in 1989 [2]. In particular, the
introduction of well-trained transplant coordinators and public
health campaigns helped inﬂuence this dramatic increase in
transplant donors.
Finally, the practical implementation of hard versus soft opt-out
systems is unclear. Despite the distinction, questionnaire studies
involving transplant professionals have demonstrated that organ
donor consent almost always involves consultation with the next-
of-kin in both opt-out systems, as well as in opt-in systems [11].
Therefore, certain countries that use opt-out organ donationexplicit consent) among the 25 countries with the highest registered rate of deceased
nsplantation data, produced by the WHO-ONT collaboration.
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organ donation but much lower actual rates of donation. This
demonstrates that the majority stay with the default option and
that the important decision about organ donation is often made by
the next-of-kin following death [11].
Greater clarity is required to determine the true impact of opt-
out legislation itself. In contrast to the existing before-and-after
comparisons, or comparative analyses of different countries, a
controlled, prospective trial comparing opt-out versus opt-in offers
the best chance of determining the impact of such a policy change
alone. Last year's passage of an opt-out system in Wales may
represent this opportunity, where effects of the legislative change
in Wales can be compared to culturally similar parts of the United
Kingdom that are exposed to the confounders that accompany this
change in law.
3. Incentivized organ donation
Rates of organ donation in Israel have traditionally been
amongst the lowest of Western countries. Among the reasons for
this has been the refusal by some ultraorthodox religious groups to
accept brain-death as death and consequently objecting to organ
donation [12]. In order to increase the numbers of organ donors the
Israeli Ministry of Health introduced the Organ Transplant Act in
2008. According to this law, persons who consent to organ dona-
tion or who have ﬁrst degree relatives that consent to organ
donation are given priority if they subsequently require a trans-
plant. In addition, disincentives for living donation were removed,
allowing donors to claim reimbursement for loss of income, re-
covery and transportation [13]. Implementation of this system was
followed by signiﬁcant increases in living and deceased organ
donation rates, with preliminary data in 2011 indicating that there
was a decrease in the number of candidates awaiting organ trans-
plants and fewer recipients dying on the waiting lists [12].
Despite this initial success, ethical concerns have also been
raised. Firstly, patients with numerous ﬁrst-degree relatives are at
an advantage over those with no siblings [14]. A response to this
concern is that individuals with few relatives can sign their own
donor cards and ensure themselves priority. Secondly, directed
living donors (i.e. persons who have already donated organs to
speciﬁed patients) were not initially given priority in the present
Israeli system. The higher priority of persons demonstrating intent
to donate by signing a donor card over thosewho had already taken
the risks of donating organs was controversial and raised questions
over the ethical basis of this law [14]. However, the Israeli gov-
ernment subsequently passed an amendment to the law, extending
priority for organ allocation to those who had already donated an
organ. Thirdly, the beneﬁt to persons as a result of the actions of
their ﬁrst-degree relatives, rather than their own good deeds has
been questioned. Finally, the passage of this legislation has resulted
in opportunity for strategic behavior where people register as or-
gan donors in order to receive priority, yet instruct their next-of-kin
to not consent to organ donation upon death [14].
Data gathered to date represents a preliminary insight into the
efﬁcacy of the Organ Transplant Act of Israel. However, longer-term
follow-up is necessary to assess the true impact of legislation to
incentivize organ donation in this way.
4. Commercial organ transplants
The sale of organs for transplantation has largely been consid-
ered unethical. According to the National Organ Transplant Act of
the United States, “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transferaffects interstate commerce.” [15]. Similarly, The Transplantation
Society states “No transplant surgeon/team shall be involved
directly or indirectly on the buying or selling of organs/tissues or in
any transplant activity aimed at commercial gain.” [16].
Currently Iran remains the only nation to offer a legalized,
regulated system of payment for kidney transplantation, which
now accounts for over half of the transplants performed there.
Under this system, an organization called The Dialysis and
Transplant Patients Association (DAPTA) performs preliminary
matching of donors with recipients, with hospital expenses paid
by the government. The transplant donor receives a donation from
the government and an additional payment from the recipient,
with the amount determined prior to transplantation. It is claimed
that waiting lists for a kidney have been cleared in Iran, with over
50% of all patients with end stage renal disease transplanted [17].
Within this model, regulations have been implemented to limit
transplant tourism by prohibiting non-Iranians from receiving
transplants from Iranian donors or donating to Iranian patients.
Closer analysis of Iranian kidney donors in questionnaire studies
have shown that 66% of organ vendors in Iran lived below the
poverty line and 91% expressed satisfaction with their decision to
donate [18]. However, these facts have been disputed by some
transplant physicians within Iran who have raised concern that
the data has been selected from chosen transplant centers to
represent the nation.
Compensation for organ transplantation is illegal in other parts
of theworld, but it has been practiced in countries such as India and
Pakistan. In Pakistan, it is estimated that commercial transplants
constituted 70% of all transplants in 2007, with more than half of
the recipients originating from developed countries [19]. These
commercial transplants are performed in private centers and
involve an organ broker. The recipient pays a fee which covers the
cost of the kidney, the immunosuppressive drugs and the hospital
stay. Follow-up studies evaluating the outcomes of transplant
tourists returning to developed nations, including the United
Kingdom and Canada, have demonstrated an increased rate of in-
fectious complications and poor graft outcomes [19]. This has been
attributed to the inadequate facilities and poor patient selection
criteria by the commercial transplant centers. In addition, 34% of
vendors in Pakistan have been reported to live below the poverty
line, on less than US$1 per day, with a 90% rate of illiteracy and 69%
working as bonded laborers [20]. The motivation for the majority of
these donors was to receive ﬁnancial support to pay off debts and
little long-term economic beneﬁt was observed [20]. In an effort to
curb the commercial organ trade in Pakistan, the Transplantation of
Human Organs and Tissues Ordinance was enacted in 2010 [21].
While slightly reduced numbers of organs have been illegally
transplanted after the law was passed, the trade has remained
active, particularly because of the ongoing demand for unlawful
commercial transplants from foreigners who are unable to get or-
gans in their home countries.
The prospect of introducing a system of regulated payment for
organs to developed nations has been mooted on numerous occa-
sions [22e25]. In such systems, only living-unrelated (non-
directed) transplants would be rewarded, to maintain current rates
of cadaveric and living-related donation. As transplantation is
considerably more economical than maintaining patients on dial-
ysis, a system of regulated, government-funded compensation for
donors may save healthcare costs in the long-term [27]. Proponents
of such a system have also suggested that reducing the number of
patients on the transplant waiting lists in the developing world
would dramatically lower the demand for organ trafﬁcking and
commercialism in countries like Pakistan [26]. Prior to adoption of
the compensated system of organ donation in Iran, a long list of
patients waiting for organs would seek transplants from alternative
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cleared following establishment of the current system [28].
Those opposing payment for organs have suggested that this
system raises the potential for exploitation of the poor. The impli-
cation here is that the addition of commercial considerations to the
already complex decision-making process that surrounds live or-
gan donation may cloud judgment and cause those in dire ﬁnancial
situations to overlook the potential risks [29]. Another argument
against payment system is the ethical concern relating to
commodiﬁcation of organs and human tissues, which would
depersonalize and devalue the human body [29].
Other concerns have included the possibility of generating un-
favorable public opinion towards the ﬁeld of transplantation,
particularly in the event of harm or death to an organ vendor. Such
instances would have the potential for signiﬁcant erosion in the
public's trust of government and healthcare professionals [29].
Ethical concerns would preclude the widespread implementa-
tion of systems involving payments for organs in the near future.
However, policy makers can draw lessons from the existing expe-
riences involving payments and incentives. In particular, govern-
ments must ﬁnd methods of removing disincentives such as loss of
income and reimbursement of expenses for those who commit to
organ donation.5. Mandated choice models
Psychological research has demonstrated that preferences are
not yet articulated in the minds of those who have not been asked
[7]. The decision about organ donation is frequently made by rel-
atives of the deceased at a time of signiﬁcant emotional distress.
Therefore, in order to allow well considered decisions relating to
organ donation to be made by the organ donors themselves,
mandated choice models have been put forward [30].
In mandated choice models of organ donation, all adults are
asked to make a decision onwhether to donate their organs. Under
this system, individuals are free to choose to donate, not donate or
defer the decision to their relatives. As the name suggests, it is
compulsory for all persons to make a decision, with the expressed
choice potentially revocable. It has been suggested that theFig. 2. Schematic of our modiﬁed mandated choice model. This model is different than pre
persons are considered organ donors under “soft” presumed consent. In this instance, thequestion of organ donation can be presented to members of society
as part of tax returns, driver's license application forms or beneﬁt
claims. A survey study in young adults in the United States indi-
cated that a mandated choice model for organ donation is widely
supported when compared with other organ donation systems
including presumed consent [31]. In addition, mandated choice
models have previously received support from the American
Medical Association [32].
It has been argued that forcing people to make a decision on
organ donation is unacceptable as it undermines an individual's
autonomy. On the other hand, supporters of mandated choice
models maintain that this model actually promotes autonomy, by
ensuring a person's preference for their organs is upheld after
death rather than allowing relatives to override the wishes of the
deceased [33]. Importantly, decisions about end-of-life questions
can be difﬁcult and some people might not feel able to make them.
This is illustrated by the experience in US state of Virginia, where a
mandated choice model for organ transplantation was attempted
and 24% of the population refused to select a preference [34].6. An alternative solution
Our review of the literature has identiﬁed that mandated choice
models, well-supported transplant coordinators approaching rela-
tives, incentives and public education campaigns are effective
methods of increasing organ donation rates.
Based on this, one possible way to drive organ donation rates
would be to develop a modiﬁed mandated choice model which
actively and systematically presents all members of society with
three simple options (Fig. 2):
(i) registration as an organ donor
(ii) registration as not an organ donor
(iii) deferred registration
As in mandated choice models, voter registration or driver's li-
cense application may represent suitable portals to ask this ques-
tion and would allow access to a signiﬁcant proportion of a
country's population. In comparison to existing models, the burdenvious mandated choice models as it offers the option of deferred registration, in which
next-of-kin is consulted at the time of death.
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donation status is likely to raise ethical and legal questions. How-
ever, given the number of lives that are lost while waiting for an
organ transplant, simply asking a question seems morally accept-
able. Indeed, this schema empowers people to make informed,
active choices. Asking a universal question of the general popula-
tion will increase awareness and help close the gap between the
number of people that declare to be in favor of organ donation, and
the number of individuals that effectively enroll as organ donors.
A number of conditions must be satisﬁed for this proposed
system to be successful. First, the responder population must be
informed on the importance of organ transplantation. This can be
achieved through school, social networks, and mass media. Second,
registration of a choice should be observed as “hard” d these
choices should not be vetoed by family members and should be
respected by the medical team. Furthermore, a person's choice is
mutable over time, and there should be ready access to a central
registry where a person can update his or her choice. Lastly, this
system differs from traditional mandated choice systems owing to
the presence of an additional option: the choice not to decide.
Forcing doubtful responders to select an option could lead them
to opt-out. In this model, people who choose not to decide and
defer registration would be considered potential organ donors in a
“soft” opt-out system. At the end of life, the families of these in-
dividuals should be consulted in a sensitive manner by skilled
transplant coordinators.
7. Conclusion
Effective political solutions that can be enacted in the near
future are urgently needed to address the critical organ shortage.
Widespread adoption of a vendor-based system is currently
considered a step too far and would threaten to thwart the signif-
icant efforts of transplant professionals who have strived to slowly
build rates of voluntary donation. However, governments must
work to eliminate remaining disincentives, such as healthcare bills
and loss of earnings, which currently deter potentially willing do-
nors. It has even been suggested that living-unrelated donors be
nationally recognized for their altruism, in a manner similar to
military heroes [35]. In addition ongoing efforts to concurrently
increase the numbers of cadaveric donors are also required.
Given the discrepancy between the number of people that
would donate and those who actually do, the gap between intent
and action must be closed. For this to happen the question of organ
donation must be actively presented to all members of society.
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